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This paper is predicated upon the doctrine of ownership in place
of oil and gas. It recognizes that the Legislature has the right to
delegate authority to the Railroad Commission of Texas to prevent
waste. Under such authority, the Commission has the power to re-
strict the production of hydrocarbons to the reasonable market de-
mand and to prorate that production among all wells in the state.
As property rights are affected by proration, it must meet the due
process requirement of being just and reasonable. To fulfill this
requirement, each land owner must be given a reasonable opportunity
to recover his fair share of the recoverable hydrocarbons under his
land or their equivalent. Although the Commission has admirably
met this duty in the vast majority of instances, there remain several
situations in which current proration practices are fostering con-
fiscation. It is concluded that the dual proration requirements of
preventing waste and protecting correlative rights can be universally
achieved only by providing the Commission with statutory authority
to require unitization and pooling. In addition, it is believed that
statutory revisions relative to the substantial evidence rule and the
Marginal Well Act would further the protection of correlative rights.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF PRORATION
Proration procedures for oil and gas differ significantly in Texas.
These differences make it desirable to consider the procedures in-
volved in each separately.
Oil Proration'
Section 5 of Article 6049(c) provides that the Railroad Com-
mission " . . . shall have the power, and it shall be its duty, from
time to time to inquire into the production . . . of crude petroleum
oil and natural gas, and the reasonable market demand there-
for . . . . "' The Commission has chosen the monthly statewide
hearing as its vehicle for carrying out this duty. This hearing has for
*ED. NOTE:
The author of this Comment, a member of the Student Editorial Board, is also a Regis-
tered Professional Engineer, Petroleum and Natural Gas Branch, in Texas.
'For a detailed description and criticism, see Davis and Willbern, Administrative Control
of Oil Production in Texar, 22 TEXAs L. REV. 149 (1944).
'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. (1949).
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its primary purpose the establishing of the market demand for the
following month. However, any matter of general interest to the
oil industry may be considered and the notice of this meeting so
states. These statewide hearings are characterized by an easy informal-
ity which provides an opportunity for anyone to speak out on any
related subject. Ordinarily such speakers are not witnesses, are not
under oath and are not subject to cross-examination.
Although other general subjects are discussed, the principal func-
tion of the statewide hearing is to determine the market demand
upon which the adoption of proration schedules depends. By the
tenth day of the month prior to the month during which the pur-
chases will be made, each purchaser of crude oil in Texas must file
Form C-i, stating how much he is willing to buy in each field in
which he purchases. From these nominations, the Commission pre-
pares a schedule showing the totals nominated. In addition, allow-
ables for each field during the preceding month, Bureau of Mines
estimates of market demand, allowables and acutal production are
included on the schedule. The discussion of proration problems and
the proration orders finally issued are primarily based upon the in-
formation in the schedule.
Proration orders, however, are hardly decisions based upon the
scheduled information and the forum-type discussion. They more
closely represent the views of the Railroad Commissioners as to the
amount of production that will best serve the interests of the Texas
oil industry. But then, the determination of the statewide allowable
oil production does not involve questions of law or fact so much
as judgment and discretion. Proration is an intricate task - possibly
too intricate to be resolved into a stereotyped procedure of fact
finding and allocation upon the basis of such facts. Yet the dis-
cretion given to the Commission coupled with the dominant oil-
producing position of Texas probably makes the Commission the
most powerful administrative body in the United States today. The
exercise of this relatively unfettered discretion with no concerted
effort to impose more stringent statutory controls upon the Com-
mission is both a tribute to the Commission's judgment in these
affairs and an indication that the good of the Texas oil industry has
been paramount in all regulatory considerations.
The statewide allowable is generally promulgated in two orders.
The "Special Order Fixing the Allowable Production of Crude Oil
in the Various Districts and Fields in Texas" contains the barrels of
production allowed from each field, and sums these fields by dis-
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tricts. The second order, the "General Shut-Down Order," contains
the number of days oil wells must be shut down and the number
of producing days for the month in question. The significance of
these producing days is best considered in connection with the
determination of field and well allowables.
Field Allowables: Statutory authority for allocating the statewide
allowable - . . . production of crude oil upon a fair and reasonable
basis among the various pools in the state . . . " is found in Section 6
of Article 6049 (d). Within the individual pool, the Commission
is charged by Section 7 of Article 6049 (c) with the duty to " . . .
distribute, prorate or otherwise apportion or allocate, the allowable
production among the various producers on a reasonable basis."
In carrying out these statutory duties, the Commission sets up
maximum efficient rates, generally spoken of as M. E. R.'s, for each
pool in the state. These rates should represent the maximum pro-
duction the pools can sustain continuously without incurring waste.
Before an M. E. R. can be determined for a field, it is necessary
that sufficent producing wells be completed within that field to
provide the data required for such a determination.
If a new well is the first to be completed in a particular oil pool,
it is assigned a "discovery" allowable. This allowable is set on a per-
well basis according to the depth of the producing formation dis-
covered by the well. Such allowables are continued for eighteen
months or until six wells are completed within the new field. Upon
discontinuance of the discovery allowables, the new wells are assigned
depth bracket, or "yardstick," allowables pending the determination
of M. E. R. allowables.'
'Special Order No. 20- 29,540 effective June 1, 1954, Railroad Commission of Texas
established the following scales of allowables: (The current "yardstick" depth bracket al-
lowable is also shown by way of comparison)
20 acre
Depth Bracket
Interval of Depth Daily Well Allowable Allowable
0- 1,000 20 barrels 28
1,000- 2,000 40 37- 46
2,000- 3,000 60 55
3,000- 4,000 80 64
4,000- 5,000 100 73
5,000- 6,000 120 82
6,000- 7,000 140 91
7,000- 8,000 160 101









Not only does this allowable exceed the average per-well allowable
for older reservoirs, but it is not subject to shut-down days. In per-
iods of depressed market demand - such as those existing during
1956 _- the latter exemption permits the discovery wells to produce
approximately twice the oil to which wells completed at similar
depths in previously discovered fields are limited. During periods
of high market demand - such as during 1948' - discovery wells
have the lesser but still substantial advantage of the discovery al-
lowable being generally higher than the depth bracket and average
M. E. R. allowable for similar depths.
After enough wells have been completed to provide sufficient
data, an M. E. R. hearing is called. Notice is given to all operators
in the new field of the time, place and purpose of the hearing. On the
basis of the data compiled, the maximum rate at which the reser-
voir can be produced without causing waste is determined. The
operators of the wells normally make this calculation and submit
it to an Examiner on the Commission's Staff who conducts the
M. E. R. Hearing. Documents and testimony under oath are offered
to support the rate submitted, and very liberal admission policies
allow comment on any phase of the problem by any interested party.
The Examiner - a technically trained member of the Engineering
Department of the Commission - after consultation with other
members of the Department, submits a report on the hearing for
use of the Commission only. In a group meeting with the Commis-
sioners themselves, the order determining the M. E. R. is issued.
Although the allocation may, and these days usually does, involve
acreage or other considerations, the actual order is in the form of
a daily allowable for each well in the field. Where acreage enters the
determination, the order states the number of producing acres as-
signed each well. In addition, allowables decreased because of high






Paragraph 2 provides, in part, that the well may receive ... its discovery oil allowable,
exempt from shut-down days for a period of I8 months from the date of the assignment of
the oil allowable or until the sixth oil well shall have been completed..." in the new
field.




a See note 4 supra.
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Determination of Scheduled Producing Days: After daily M. E. R.
allowables are established in the major fields throughout the state,
the Commission has the total daily producing capacity compiled.
In addition the producing capacity of fields exempted from shut-
down are totaled. By subtracting the exempted production from
the "market demand" determined in the monthly statewide hearing
and dividing the remainder by the daily producing capacity, the
number of producing days necessary to obtain the desired produc-
tion is ascertained. This number of producing days for a particular
month - called "scheduled allowable days" - multiplied by the
M. E. R. allowable for a given well gives the volume of oil that
may be produced from that well during the month.
M. E. R. allowables are subject to periodic review upon initiation
by the Commission. In addition, interested parties may request a
hearing for the purpose of revising the M. E. R. assigned to a field.
Requests for downward revision are not uncommon, particularly
with a rising market demand or maximum producing days. With
falling market demand and fewer producing days, requests to in-
crease the M. E. R. are more prevalent.
Gas Proration
Statutes relating to the conservation of gas are characterized by
a more enlightened attitude brought about by greater understanding
of the proration problem at the time they were written. In addition,
the statutory directives have been fairly well consolidated in Article
6008.
Section 1 of this article states that the law " . . . is enacted for
the protection of public and private interests . . . by prohibiting
waste and compelling ratable production." Section 10 states that the
Commission " . . . shall prorate and regulate [gas] production for the
protection of public and private interests: (a) In the prevention of
waste ... (b) In the adjustment of correlative rights .. ."
Proration of Gas Reservoirs: Section 11 of Article 6008 states that
the Commission " . . . shall exercise authority to adjust correlative
rights ... when evidence introduced at a hearing to be held as herein
provided' will support a finding that the ... daily potential capacity
°Section 7 of Article 6049(c) provides that " ... upon the verified complaint of any
person interested in the subject matter, that waste of crude petroleum or natural gas is tak-
ing place or is reasonably imminent, the Commission may hold a hearing .... At said hear-
ing all parties interested shall be entitled to be heard and introduce evidence .... No simi-
lar statutory provision has been found for the express purpose of adjusting correlative rights
relative to oil production, but the policy of the Commission with respect to the calling of
hearings has been extremely liberal.
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to produce of all gas wells located in a common reservoir is in excess
of the daily market demand for gas . . . from such common reser-
voir." Section 12 stipulates that it shall be
•. . the duty of the Commission to determine the status of gas produc-
tion from all reservoirs in this state. If and when the Commission
finds that waste exists or is imminent ... or that the capacity of the
wells to produce gas from any reservoir exceeds the market demand
for gas from such reservoir, the Commission shall proceed by proper
order to prorate the gas production from such reservoir on a reason-
able basis. On or before the 20th day of each month, the Commission,
after notice and hearing shall determine (1) the lawful market demand
for gas to be produced from each such reservoir during the following
month; and (2) the volume of gas that can be produced from such
reservoir and each well therein during the following month, without
waste. The Commission shall then fix the monthly reservoir allowables
of gas to be produced from such reservoir at the lawful market demand
therefor or at the volume that can be produced without waste, which-
ever is the smaller quantity. The monthly reservoir allowable shall be
allocated among all wells entitled to produce gas therefrom so as to
give each well its fair share ... provided that each well shall be re-
stricted to the amount of gas that can be produced from it without
waste.
In carrying out the mandate of this section, the Commission re-
quires the submission of two forms to provide the basis for the de-
termination of market demand. Form GN, "Nominations for the
Purchase of Gas," is required monthly from purchasers, and indicates
the amount of gas which the purchaser wishes to buy from each
field in which he purchases gas. Form PF, "Forecast for the Produc-
tion and Disposition of Gas Well Gas in Prorated Gas Fields," is also
required monthly but is submitted by the producer. The form con-
tains estimates of prospective gas production and disposition by fields
and reservoirs. Both of these forms must be submitted by the ninth
of the month prior to the month forecasted.
With regard to the determination of waste, the usual criterion is
Rule 25, which generally restricts a gas well to 25% of its open
flow potential. However, it is becoming the practice for field rules
similar to those prescribed for oil fields to be promulgated after
hearings to establish proper rates. This is particularly true with re-
spect to gas reservoirs being "cycled" - a process in which the
reservoir gas is produced, stripped of its liquids, and then reinjected
into another part of the reservoir to maintain reservoir pressure at
an efficient producing level.
Associated-Gas Proration: The proration of associated gas, i.e.,
gas occurring in the form of a gas cap associated with an oil zone,
1957]
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is governed generally by Statewide Rule 6(b).' As noted, this rule
permits only that gas production from a gas well which has the same
volume within the reservoir as that reservoir volume voided by a full
allowable oil well producing at its maximum non-penalized gas-oil
ratio.
Modifications of Rule 6(b) may be applied for at a hearing re-
quested for that purpose. The usual qualification petitioned for in-
volves an adjustment for the normal condition that the spacing of
wells in the associated gas cap is wider than in the oil zone.
Judicial Review
Section 8 of Article 6049(c) provides:
Any interested person affected ... by any rule promulgated by the
Commission... shall have the right to file a suit in a Court of com-
petent jurisdiction in Travis County... against the Commission to
test the validity of said rules . . . . In all such trials, the burden of
proof shall be upon the party complaining of such rules, regulations or
orders and such rules, regulations, or orders so complained of shall be
deemed prima facie valid.
In Wrather v. Humble Oil and Refining Co.," upholding the right
of one other than an operator adjacent to the tract affected by the
order to bring suit, it was held that the statutory requirement of
"any interested person" would be given a liberal, but sensible, con-
struction. The court also pointed out that " . . . it is not necessary
that the plaintiff show legal injury and damages . . . for the reason
that ... the primary issue is the validity of the Commission's order.""
In Standard Oil of Texas v. Railroad Commission," the court held
that the satutory language "to test the validity of said rules" made
the suit essentially one for a declaratory judgment. It went on to
hold that the answer of the Commission praying that the contested
order be sustained was a prayer for affirmative relief and that the
plaintiff's request for a non-suit would not be allowed to prejudice
that relief.
The meaning of "trial" was stated to contemplate " . . . a judicial
examination of all the issues of law and fact" in Marrs v. Railroad
Commission." Four years later, however, the Texas Supreme Court
in Hawkins v. Texas Co."8 held that the statutory requirement of a
Statewide Rule 6(b), Railroad Commission of Texas. See note 32 infra.
8 147 Tex. 144, 214 S.W.2d 112 (1948).
'214 S.W.2d at 115.
10215 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. w.o.m.
" 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941 (1944).
'146 Tex. 511, 209 S.W.2d 338, 340 (1948).
[Vol. I I
COMMENTS
trial ". . . does not mean a trial as of the ordinary civil suit in which
the court makes its own findings based upon a preponderance of the
evidence before it. Nevertheless, it means that ...the court deter-
mines from all of the evidence before it, the entire record, whether
the Commission's action is or is not reasonably supported by sub-
stantial evidence." Under this holding, judicial review becomes a
matter of applying the substantial evidence rule.
The Substantial Evidence Rule: The application of the substantial
evidence rules to Railroad Commission actions was given a thorough
analysis by the Texas Supreme Court in 1942 in Railroad Commission
(and Trem Carr) v. Shell Oil Co." In pointing out that the act pro-
viding for judicial review contemplated a trial de novo, the court
stated that:
- there would have been no necessity for the placing of the burden
of proof if proof were not to be heard. The Act in question clearly
contemplates that the evidence shall be taken anew in the district
court .... If the matter covered by the order is one committed to the
agency by the Legislature, and involves the exercise of its sound judg-
ment and discretion in the administration of the matter so committed
to it, the court will not undertake to ... determine the wisdom or the
advisability of the particular ruling, but will sustain the actions of the
agency so long as its conclusions are reasonably supported by substantial
evidence ... the issue is not whether or not the agency came to the
proper fact conclusion... but whether or not it acted arbitrarily and
without regard to the facts.14
The logic of the above seems clear. However, the issue begins to
cloud when the opinion goes on to state that " . . . the trial is not
for the purpose of determining whether the agency actually heard
sufficient evidence to support its orders, but whether at the time
such order was entered there then existed sufficient facts to justify
the same." 1' This peculiar choice of language would seem to uphold
a decision made without hearing any evidence if it could be estab-
lished upon review that justifying facts did exist.
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co." followed the Trem Carr case in holding
that the substantial evidence rule does not limit the parties to the
evidence taken by the Commission. The case then went on to reaffirm
that the Commission's action should be sustained when reasonably
supported by substantial evidence. In so doing, however, the court
was careful to point out that the . . . trial court does not have to
13139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942).
14 161 S.W.2d at 1029.
'3 161 S.W.2d at 1030.
'6 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424 (1946).
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consider incredible, perjured or unreasonable testimony since such
evidence is not substantial."1
The Hawkins case contained additional qualifying language re-
lating to the rule. There the court stated that the rule ". . . does not
mean that a mere scintilla of evidence will suffice nor does it mean
that the court is bound to select the testimony on one side with ab-
solute blindness to that introduced by the other .... The Substantial
Evidence Rule does not contemplate that the testimony of a single
witness supporting the Railroad Commission's action requires sus-
taining the Commission regardless of evidence to the contrary." The
opinion went on to hold that the rule in essence was that the " ...
court is not to substitute discretion for that committed to the Agency
by the Legislature . . . . "" Considering the interpretation placed on
the substantial evidence rule in the Trapp and Hawkins cases, it
seems to be a quite reasonable approach to determining the legality
of complex regulations affecting the highly technical oil industry.
The substantial evidence rule is neither unfair nor unwieldy. Used
within the area of delegated matters requiring sound judgment and
discretion it is probably the best method of judicial review. But it is
submitted that the basis of the rule lies within the judicial framework
of deciding facts in the trial forum and reviewing such fact findings
on appeal only to the extent of determining if they are based upon
sufficient evidence. To maintain that the validity of an administrative
action is to be based upon the facts existing rather than the evidence
presented might be suitable for "Star Chamber" proceedings, but it
is foreign to the American system of justice. Not only is such a
system unjust, but it is inherently unwieldy. Litigants must not only
prepare their case for the Railroad Commission hearing, but if the
validity of the resulting order is contested they must go to the ex-
pense of re-assembling and re-presenting witnesses and evidence to
the trial court. The foundation of the substantial evidence rule is
to let those qualified decide the action to be taken under a given
set of facts. If their action is to be sustained if reasonably supported
by evidence, surely their determination of the facts upon which their
action is based should be susceptible to the same rule.
It is therefore submitted that with regard to those matters re-
quiring the exercise of the Commission's discretion, it would con-
tribute to the economy and fairness of the judicial process to have
the Commission determine and report the facts upon which its action
is founded. Such a revision should be by legislative amendment and
17 198 S.W.2d at 440.
18209 S.W.2d at 340.
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could stipulate that review would be limited to questions of law and
the determination as to whether the fact findings were based upon
substantial evidence."9
Codification
A minor but annoying defect that might be classed as procedural
is the poor arrangement of the statutory and regulatory material
relative to the conservation of oil and gas. A consolidation and topi-
cal rearrangement of the statutory material should be easily accom-
plished in view of the excellent guide provided by the Interstate Oil
Compact Commission."
The regulatory material promulgated by the Railroad Commission
would be more difficult to rearrange. In general, it is arranged under
two broad headings.2 First appear the "Statewide Rules" having
application to all fields within the state not specifically excepted.
This requires 100 pages. The second heading contains the specific
field rules applicable to each of the 1800 fields in Texas. These rules
are separate and - in conjunction with the statewide rules - com-
plete for each field. They are set out in 2600 pages. To search such
a mass of material to determine the number of different proration
systems and the number of fields to which each is applied is too
formidable a task to be within the scope of this paper." However,
such information should be available both for the purposes of
acquainting new operators with the policies and possibilities of
proration orders and for providing comparison information to in-
dicate that the statewide allowable is allocated upon " . . . a fair and
reasonable basis among the various pools in the State."
SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF CONTROVERSY
With the procedural aspects as background, the substantive aspects
of proration might best be discussed in relation to the controversies
they have fostered. Prior to such a discussion, it is necessary to con-
"2Alternate plans for improving the fairness and utility of the substantial evidence rule
are pointed out by Harris in A Reappraisal of the Substantial Evidence Rule, 3 Sw.L.J. 416
(1949).
"A FORM FOR AN OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION STATUTE by a Drafting Subcommittee
of the Legal Committee of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission.
"1 RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION, OIL AND GAS.
" Such a compilation up to 1948 was made in a paper by H. H. Baker at the Spring
Meeting of the Southwestern District A.P.I. Division of Production, Galveston, Texas. It in-
dicated a trend in allocation toward less emphasis on per well allocation formulas. However,
as of that date, 17% of all fields reported were upon a per well basis only, 35% upon




sider two subjects pertinent to all phases of conservation by regu-
lation - waste and correlative rights.
Waste
Statutory provisions define waste to include oil well operation with
inefficient gas-oil ratios, underground waste, physical waste, and
production in excess of reasonable market demand. Although these
definitions involve broad adjectives, the courts have found it desir-
able to extend further the scope of the term. In Corzelius v. Rail-
road Commission,3 it was held that conservation laws are intended
to prevent waste whether specifically defined therein or not. In
determining waste, Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co."4 laid down
the expansive test that "[w]hatever dictates of reason, fairness and
good judgment under all facts leads to the conclusion of waste, is
denounced by the Legislature as unlawful." This case also held that
the " . . . Railroad Commission has the power to define what con-
stitutes waste so long as the definition is reasonable, non-discrimi-
natory and non-confiscatory."
More precise stipulations as to waste are presented in the statutes
with reference to certain prohibited uses of gas. In addition, the
Marginal Well Act,"5 states that " . . . to curtail production below
marginal limit .. .is hereby declared to be waste." A concise defini-
tion of waste was also given in Hawkins v. Texas Co. This simply
states that " . . . waste means the ultimate loss of oil. 26
Regardless of the manner in which waste is determined to exist,
once determined, it is the most powerful force known in the field
of conservation. Wells are drilled, shut-in, granted larger allowables,
assigned smaller allowables and permitted special operating rules on
the basis of preventing waste. This is as it should be, for the motivat-
ing purpose of conservation measures is the prevention of waste.
Correlative Rights
The principle of ownership in place of oil and gas in Texas was
firmly established in 1915 by the Texas Supreme Court in Texas
Co. v. Daugherty." Such ownership is often said to be subject to the
law of capture and valid Railroad Commission orders.
The first limitation has arisen from language such as that used
23 182 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
14 146 Tex. 286, 206 S.W.2d 235, 240 (1947).
2' TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6049(b) § 2 (1949).
2' 209 S.W.2d at 343.
27 107 Tex. 234, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
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in Brown v. Humble Oil fg Refining Co.,"0 wherein the court stated
that the " . . . rule of ownership of oil and gas in place should be
considered in connection with the law of capture." The court re-
ferred to the law of capture as a property right " . . . limited only
by the possibility of the . . . exercise of the same right of cap-
ture . . . " by adjoining landowners. It is this limitation that es-
tablishes the correlative defense against the law of capture. This
correlative right of defense to "go and do likewise" was promulgated
in the landmark case on the law of capture - Bernard v. Monoga-
hela.5' All of the principal cases dealing with the law of capture
since the Bernard case was decided in 1907 have reiterated the right
to the defense. 0
But what have proration and regulation done to this defense? No
longer can the adjacent owner "go and do likewise," but he must
comply with the Commission orders which often prevent his doing
anything. When the Brown case was decided in 1935, proration was
in its infancy. The court could not know - and did not consider -
the widespread destruction of the defense to the law of capture which
would result from the efficient regulation of oil and gas production.
A later decision of the Texas Supreme Court, Elliff v. Texon Drill-
ing Co.,"1 notes that the rule of capture" . .. would seem to conflict
with the view of absolute ownership of the minerals in place ......
They resolve the conflict by rephrasing the rule to be one of ". . . no
liability for reasonable and legitimate drainage from the common
pool ..." and point out that regulations should afford each land-
owner " ...the opportunity to produce his fair share of the recov-
erable oil and gas beneath his land .... " Under these conditions, the
court concludes that "... if all operators exercise the same degree of
skill and diligence . . . " each will generally recover that which he
owns - the oil and gas in place under his land. This enlightened view
of the function of the law of capture in today's closely regulated oil
producing operations is to free the diligent from liability for accept-
ing the benefits of his neighbor's failure to exercise diligence. Here-
in lies the validity of the law of capture today. No longer can it be
fairly referred to as a "property right," for it seems clear that the
law of capture is predicated upon the solid foundation of the neigh-
bor's correlative right to utilize the defense to "go and do likewise."
21 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (1935).
29 216 Pa. 362, 65 AtI. 801 (1907).
0 For an excellent discussion of the law of capture, see Shank, Present Status of the Law
of Capture, SIXTH ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAs LAW & TAXATION 257 (1955).3' 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
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Our regulatory scheme has cut away the foundation, and the old rule
should not be propped up by classifying it as a property right - the
rule should fall with the defense.
There is no question as to the ownership of in-place hydrocarbons
being subject to valid Railroad Commission orders. This property
right - like all property rights - is subject to the valid exercise of
the police power. The Commission has been designated by the Legis-
lature to exercise the police power with relation to conservation of
oil and gas.
Such exercise must of course meet the due process requirements
when private property rights are involved. If the debris of the now
unfounded law of capture is cleared away, it can be seen that certain
proration practices have led to undue discrimination tantamount to
confiscation.
Confiscation as Related to Associated Gas Proration
One of the more common situations in which proration practices
have given rise to confiscatory conditions has been in those reser-
voirs having a gas cap owned primarily by those having only a small
interest in the associated oil zone. A major reason for confiscation
in these situations is that associated gas proration is generally accom-
plished by Statewide Rule 6 (b)."
The Effect of the Rule: The rule, in limiting production from
a gas well to the same reservoir volume as that allowed from an oil
well, fails to take into account the greater expansibility of the gas.
Consider equal initial reservoir volumes of oil and associated gas
which are drilled to the same density. As the expansibility of the gas
is two to five times that of the saturated oil, gas expansion will sup-
ply from two-thirds to five-sixths of the total producing energy.
However, Rule 6 (b) limits the production to equal reservoir volumes.
Therefore, from one-sixth to one-third of the volume produced from
the oil zone will be replaced by gas migrating from the associated
gas cap. Where ownership differs in the two zones, such migration
represents uncompensated drainage.
A number of other factors contribute to these drainage conditions
being even more confiscatory as concerns the associated gas owner.
First, the language of the rule restricts the gas well to the hydro-
carbon displacement from the oil well which withdraws the maxi-
32 "Any gas well producing from the same reservoir in which oil wells are completed and
producing shall be allowed to produce daily only that amount of gas which is the volumetric
equivalent in reservoir displacement of the gas and oil produced from that oil well in the




mum amount of gas in the production of its oil allowable. As gas
has much greater mobility (i.e., the property of flowing at higher
volumetric rates for a given pressure differential) than oil, a gas well
can easily drain eight to sixteen times the area that an oil well in the
same formation can drain efficiently. Therefore, prudent operators
are not likely to drill wells to the same density in the gas cap as in
the oil zone of the reservoir. Indeed they could not afford to do so
for the small gas allowable obtainable under Rule 6(b). Therefore,
if the rule is applied literally to a reservoir having a per-well allow-
able, the gas cap production would likely be only one-eighth or less
of the amount necessary for equivalent volumetric displacement
assumed in the above discussion.
In the general discussion, equal reservoir volumes of oil and gas
were assumed. In countless reservoirs producing under gas-expansion
drive the gas volume will substantially exceed that of the oil, often
by a factor or two or more. Generally, the better definition of these
larger gas caps results in much wider spacing in their gas caps than in
reservoirs having smaller proportionate gas caps. Without a corres-
ponding increase in volumetric withdrawals the loss occurring to the
gas interests is increased directly as the size of the gas cap relative
to the oil zone increases.
But the most basic confiscatory result of Rule 6 (b) is that it has
greatly reduced - in fact, more often eliminated - the markability
of gas. The economics of pipe line operation demand large rates of
flow to justify construction of such lines. Rule 6(b) generally re-
stricts gas production to but a few percent of the gas well's poten-
tial. Economics prevent the development of the associated gas cap
to the same density as the oil zone so that few wells are available to
receive the small 6(b) allowable. Therefore, there is no incentive for
the laying of a pipe line to the associated gas field even though the
gas reserve available for dedication is substantial. Without a pipe line
outlet, even the meager 6(b) allowable is lost except for relatively
insignificant uses within the field. Therefore, what appears to be a
mildly discriminatory measure designed to increase ultimate oil re-
covery becomes a completely confiscatory measure in the great ma-
jority of associated gas reservoirs in which the gas ownership differs
significantly from the oil.
The Reason for the Rule: Rule 6(b) was formulated for two
reasons. First was the desire to maintain the more expansible and less
valuable gas in the ground as a source of producing energy for the
more valuable oil. The second reason was to prevent the over pro-
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duction of gas and an invasion of the gas sand by oil which would
result in a loss of oil. Both of these reasons are based upon the high
and compelling purpose of preventing underground waste. At the
time the rule was promulgated the market for gas was limited pri-
marily to huge non-associated gas fields. The discrimination against
the associated gas owner was so insignificant it could be passed off as
merely a misfortune similar to that of the mineral owner having no
minerals beneath his property.
The waste-prevention reasons for the rule continue to exist. But
no longer is the gas in these associated caps of little market value. The
forty billion MCF of associated gas reserves in Texas are now worth
more than four billion dollars. Compared to the less than two hundred
million dollar value of the seven billion MCF of associated gas reserves
in 193 3,'3 the year Rule 6(b) was made effective, it can be seen that
the nature of the discrimination has been drastically altered. As sub-
stantive due process demands reasonableness, it is submitted that
literal application of Rule 6 (b) is now so unreasonable as to result in
confiscation.
To permit regulatory discrimination not amounting to confisca-
tion to persist under changed conditions where such discrimination
does amount to confiscation is to admit that the constitutional pro-
tection of due process will be extinguished by the mere passage of
time. Such an admission must be rejected.
Possible Remedies: An acceptable substitute for Rule 6(b) must
continue to prevent the waste resulting from the invasion of the as-
sociated gas cap by oil. Although the engineering soundness of con-
serving the gas expansion energy to produce the oil more efficiently is
unquestioned, this alone would seem to be insufficient to require one
person to leave his property unrecovered in order to allow others to
recover not only more of their property but to appropriate the pro-
perty of those restricted by Rule 6 (b).
Uncompensated migration of both oil and gas can be averted by
the practical application of current reservoir engineering principles.
These principles permit the calculation of the relative productions
required from the oil and gas zones in order to prevent the movement
of the boundary between these zones. The prevention of such move-
ment would eliminate uncompensated drainage. In the larger reser-
voirs where confiscation is a serious problem, the relative gas rate
would usually be sufficient to support a pipe line connection. The gas
3 HENSHAW, NATURAL-GAS STATISTICS (1955), published by Bureau of Business Research,
The University of Texas.
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production could be permitted to be taken from a relatively small
number of selected gas cap wells without causing localized migration,
thereby making the method economically feasible for the gas owners
and operators.
However, there is a major drawback to this remedy. As the more
expansible gas is produced in greater volumes, the rate of pressure
decline increases. Excessive pressure decline gives rise to a physical
phenomenon known as a relative permeability effect. This effect causes
gas to flow preferentially to the oil and large volumes of oil are by-
passed and left unrecovered.
A more desirable remedy would be to produce an underground hy-
drocarbon reservoir as such, and not with regard to surface property
lines having no physical significance within the reservoir. It is uni-
formly recognized that the production of a reservoir as a pool results
in the greatest recovery of oil. It is recognized that unitization of
property interests is usually necessary to this production method."4 It
is also recognized that the public has an interest in increasing the re-
covery of the state's natural resources. In Railroad Commission V.
Rowan Oil Co., 5 it was pointed out that the prevention of waste and
the protection of correlative rights are established public policies of
this state. There is no better way to carry out these dual policies than
to foster unitization-the recognized method of increasing recovery
and the best method of protecting correlative rights while preventing
waste.
The objective advantages of unitization are so overwhelming that
it would seem that any serious objection would be precluded."0 How-
ever, the subjective aspects under Rule 6 (b) are a serious deterrent to
realizing the twin goals of waste prevention and protection of cor-
relative rights under unitization. By operating essentially to prevent
the associated gas owners from marketing their gas, Rule 6(b) has
created a situation in which income is realized only by the oil owners.
Therefore, the oil owners are currently receiving payment for all their
oil plus the gas migrating from the associated gas cap to their wells.
As unitization would result in their receiving only their proportion-
ate share of the total production, the current income of the oil owners
would decline. So long as Rule 6 (b) operates to benefit the oil owners
" For a general discussion of unitization, see HOFFMAN, VOLUNTARY POOLING AND UNIT-
IZATION (1954).
3 152 Tex. 439, 259 S.W.2d 173, 175 (1953).
" For an excellent discussion disposing of the alleged constitutional, anti-trust, and non-
protection of small property owners objections to unitization, see Jacobs, Unit Operation of
Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L. J. 1207 (1948).
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at the expense of the gas owners, there will be little incentive for
voluntary unitization.
Losses occurring from the failure to unitize are not confined to
those holding title to the associated gas. Waste is not confined to in-
efficient uses of hydrocarbons, faulty production practices and poor
well completions. Waste has reference to the ultimate loss of oil. Oil
unrecovered because of the refusal of a common owner of the reser-
voir to relinquish his unfair advantage constitutes waste. The advant-
age itself is legal only by a misapplication of the law of capture. If
the gas owners were free to "go and do likewise," they could, with
their vastly superior production potential, easily seize the advantage
by reversing the direction of flow. This would cause a decreased re-
covery from what would otherwise be recovered and has been justly
branded as "waste." The refusal to unitize where it is clear that unit-
ization would result in greater recovery also causes a decreased recov-
ery from what would otherwise be recovered. Is this not also waste?
If the gas owner is to be restricted in the interest of preventing
waste, why should not the oil owner also be restricted to prevent
waste? In addition, "[e]very land owner is entitled to a fair chance
to recover the oil or gas under his land, or their equivalent, and any
denial of such chance amounts to confiscation."" It is submitted that
Rule 6(b) is currently such a denial to the gas owners and that
unitization would provide an opportunity for each landowner to
recover the oil or gas under his land or their equivalent.
Equitable Unitization
The reluctance of the Texas Legislature to require unit operation
of a reservoir centers around a national antipathy toward compulsory
actions with relation to one's private property. However, with rela-
tion to mineral interests in Texas it is believed that the failure to pro-
vide such authority is providing at best only lip service to the sanctity
of property rights.
The arguments against the granting of such authority to the Rail-
road Commission might be classified in two rather broad categories.
First is the view that such a statute is an unauthorized invasion of
private property rights. The second argument is that there is already
too much governmental control and bureaucracy.
The first argument is incongruous with existing circumstances.
Property rights have not merely been invaded by conservation regula-
tions; they have been subdued. Upon holding that conservation was
3
7 Marrs v. Railroad Commission, 142 Tex. 393, 177 S.W.2d 941, 948 (1955).
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a valid exercise of the police power, property rights became subject
to all fair statutory enactments which have a reasonable relationship
to conservation. Proration is accepted as having a reasonable relation-
ship to conservation. Authority to require pooling would be no fur-
ther invasion of oil and gas property rights; it would simply allow
that proration meet the due process requirement of being fair without
sacrificing the primary conservation purpose of preventing waste.
The viewpoint that governmental control and bureaucracy are
already excessive is too well founded to incite argument. But it does
not follow that the existence of excessive regulation is reason to
deprive regulatory agencies of the authority to discharge their duties
with complete fairness to all involved. The Railroad Commission has
the duty of preventing the waste of oil and gas. With relation to
hydrocarbon reservoirs having large associated gas caps supplying the
bulk of the producing energy for the oil, waste cannot be prevented
without disregarding the property rights of associated gas owners ex-
cept by unitization. If voluntary unitization is prevented by the re-
fusal of the oil owners to give up their unfair advantage, the Com-
mission should have the power to require unitization.
Section 8 of A Form for an Oil and Gas Conservation Statute,"8
contains a compulsory unitization provision. The important features
of this section provide that a hearing may be held upon the motion
of the Commission or any interested person to consider the need for
unitization. If the Commission finds unit operation "... reasonably
necessary to prevent waste, to increase substantially the recovery of
oil or gas, and to protect correlative rights, and the value of the esti-
mated additional recovery will exceed the estimated additional cost
incident to conducting such operation, it shall issue an order requiring
unit operation. The order shall be fair and reasonable .... " The sug-
gested form also contains a provision for vacating or amending the
order upon the written objections of a stipulated percentage of the
owners involved.
Such a statute in conjunction with the judicial review provided
for all orders is quite fair. When compared with current ineffective
attempts to protect correlative rights in associated gas reservoirs, it is
not only desirable but essential to insure maximum recovery coinci-
dent with proper regard for Texas' long-standing principle of ab-
solute ownership in place of oil and gas. Unitization-voluntary or
required-is the one method by which the public policies of waste




prevention and protection of correlative rights can be realized. The
Commission is charged with effecting these dual policies and it should
be provided with the necessary means of carrying out these duties.
Equitable Pooling
Two cases illustrate the manner in which proration by spacing has
resulted in establishing confiscatory conditions. The earlier case,
Mueller v. Sutherland,3 involved the following facts. The appellees
owned 24 acres in the Wade City Field. The Commission established
a 20 acre spacing within the field. Appellees applied for and received
permits to drill two wells upon the 24 acres, including 16 acres be-
longing to appellants in order to meet the spacing requirements. The
wells were given allowables on the basis of the twenty acre spacings.
Appellants contended that appellees were entitled to only 24/40 of
the production royalties from the wells and that the remainder be-
longed to appellants by virtue of their 16 acres being included in the
area assigned to the two wells by the drilling permit.
The majority of the court clung to the legal nicety that ... pro-
perty rights ... are unaffected by the valid rules and regulations of
the Commission respecting the development of an oil field" in hold-
ing the appellants had no right to any portion of the royalties. But
regardless of legal theories, the effect of the Commission's order was
to increase appellees' mineral interest by 16/40 and to reduce appel-
lant's interest in the same amount. The dissenting justice" points out
that the appellant's mineral interest was "rendered worthless" by the
decision and that it was ". . . clearly the taking of one man's property
and the giving of it to another." The dissent also points out that ma-
jority's reliance on the holding of Japhet v. McRae,"' decided in 1925,
that the royalties ". . . belong to the owner of the particular tract
upon which the well is located..." is unfounded. The reason the
Japhet case is not in point is that it " ... antedates the spacing and
proration statutes and regulations applied to the field here."
The second case illustrating the unjust results arising out of prora-
tion by spacing is that of Ryan v. Pickens,"' decided in 1955. The
facts involved were as follows: Appellant and appellees each owned
the mineral lease upon one-half of a tract voluntarily sub-divided
after Rule 37, the spacing rule, became applicable. Appellees secured
a permit and drilled a well upon their one-half. Appellant was denied
'9 179 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m.
40 179 S.W.2d at 809.
4' 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
4"-Tex.-, 285 S.W.2d 201 (1955).
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a permit and sought to obtain an equitable share of the oil produced
from the tract. Appellees won a take nothing judgment which was
affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. The Texas Supreme Court
first reversed and remanded but later withdrew the initial opinion
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
In the substituted opinion, the majority rely on the law of cap-
ture, "... which is a well-settled rule of property in this jurisdic-
tion." They also state that the "... Commission cannot change the
laws of Texas." The Japhet case is again relied upon to show that
"... the only safe rule is the one which gives the oil to the man who
owns the land upon which the well is located .... "
The dissent" points out that the law of capture is inapplicable
under spacing rules denying the equal right to drill. Stephens County
v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co."' is cited in support of this contention
as follows: "Drainage of adjoining property under the law of capture
[is] rationalized with ownership in place ... on the basis of equal
rights to drill."
The patent injustices involved in both the Mueller and Ryan cases
could be avoided if statutory authority were given the Commission
to require pooling of individual surface acreages too small to qualify
under the spacing area adopted for the field in question.
It is difficult to understand the reluctance of Texas legislatures to
pass such legislation. Texas and Kansas are the only significant oil
producing states to be without provision for equitable pooling. Equit-
able pooling statutes" are effective in at least seventeen other states
and in none have they given rise to the wholesale litigation or in-
equities of Rule 37.
Another situation in which proration orders having a substantial
dependence upon a per-well allowable give rise to confiscatory condi-
tions is illustrated by Railroad Commission v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co... Here, a proration order allocating one-half the daily allowable
on a per-well basis and the other half upon a surface acreage basis
resulted in wells upon .1 acre townsites receiving one-half the allow-
43285 S.W.2d 201 at 210.
44 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
4' An example of such a statute is provided in MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 319.13 (1948): "The
pooling of properties or parts thereof shall be permitted, and, if not agreed upon, the super-
visor [of wells] after conference with and recommendation by the [advisory] board, may
require such pooling in any case when and to the extent that the smallness or shape of a
separately owned tract or tracts would, under the enforcement of a uniform spacing plan or
proration or drilling unit, otherwise deprive or tend to deprive the owner of such tract of
the opportunity to recover or receive his just and -equitable share of the oil and gas and gas
energy in the pool."
46 193 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.
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able of wells drilled upon the twenty acres specified by the spacing
rule. Under such a proration order and the exceptions to the spacing
rule, the densely drilled townsites would drain thirty million barrels
of oil from the larger tracts drilled upon the specified spacing.
The court, in holding the proration order to be neither unreasonable
nor confiscatory, stated that there are ". . . certain natural advantages
which the small tracts have over large tracts in unrestricted produc-
tion; and these natural advantages may properly be taken into con-
sideration in administering the conservation laws."4 ' Although prac-
tical considerations may give this statement a semblance of fact, it
is not scientifically accurate. Under unrestricted producing and
drilling conditions, drainage from any given tract in a reasonably
uniform reservoir can be prevented. Small tract owners, although
they have been the favorite of the exception to the spacing rule
permitting at least one well on each tract no matter how small,
own only that which the larger tract owners have - the oil and
gas in place beneath their property. Certainly they should have a
fair chance to recover the oil or gas under their land. But there is
no more right to discriminate unduly against large tract owners
than against small tract owners. Our system of justice is predicated
on equality of judgment for all. Separate standards are not pro-
vided for determining what constitutes due process according to the
assets of the person claiming unwarranted deprivation. A compul-
sory pooling statute would provide equality for all under the basic
Texas property law recognizing ownership in place of oil and gas.
The Marginal Well Act
The Marginal Well Act" deems as a marginal well . . . any oil
well which is incapable of producing its maximum capacity of oil
except by pumping, gas lift, or other means of artificial lift ... and
having a maximum daily capacity for production of . . . " a specified
rate based upon producing depth." Section 2 states that "to arti-
ficially curtail production below the marginal limit . . . is hereby
declared to be waste, and no rule or order . . . shall be entered re-
" 193 S.W.2d at 832.
48 See note 25 supra.
"' Maximum daily capacity for classification as a marginal well for various producing
depth increments:
Maximum Rate Producing Interval
10 barrels per day 0 -2000'
20 .. .. 2001'-4000'
25 . . .4001'-6000'
30 .. . . 6001'-8000'
35 .. ... Over 8000'
[Vol. I1I
COMMENTS
quiring restriction of the production of any 'Marginal Well' as herein
defined."
The first paragraph of the act contains an apparent limitation that
a marginal well must be one which " . . . would be damaged, or
result in a loss of production ultimately recoverable, or cause the
premature abandonment of same, if its maximum daily production
were artificially curtailed." However, these provisions are disregarded
as the act goes on to define marginal wells merely in terms of artifi-
cial lift, producing capacity, and depth.
The motivating purpose of the act is clear; it was designed to
prevent the waste of oil as a result of the abandonment of pumping
wells because proration rules had reduced their allowable production
to the point where they could not be operated profitably. There can
be no quarrel with this motive to prevent waste. However, the ap-
plication of the act often results in inequities.
An excellent example of the discrimination brought about by the
application of the marginal well act is provided by the vast East
Texas Field. As of December 15, 1956, 2300 of the 19,900 wells
in the field had been qualified as marginal under the statutory defini-
tion. The 17,600 non-marginal wells had an average scheduled daily
allowable of 21 barrels per day per well. However, they were re-
stricted to produce only 16 days during the month. Therefore the
non-marginal wells, the majority of which had producing potentials
of hundreds of barrels per day, produced an average of 12 barrels
per day per well. Nine hundred of the marginal wells, producing
thirty-one days during the month, averaged more than 12 barrels
per day per well.
Such a penalizing of efficient producing wells in order to permit
less efficient wells to produce more oil is inequitable. One excuse
sometimes heard in justification of this situation is that the marginal
wells are located near the oil-water contact and that unless they are
allowed to continue producing at relatively high rates the oil will
migrate before it can be produced. As the natural water influx is
being augmented in East Texas by returning produced water to the
reservoir below the oil-water contact, this argument has some merit
where it is applicable. But it is submitted that the Marginal Well
Act was not intended to suppress production of efficient wells to
allow marginal wells to obtain their fair share of the production.
Real protection of correlative rights where extraneous fluids are in-
jected into hydrocarbon reservoirs is obtained through a just and
reasonable unitization - not through marginal well provisions which
1957]
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do not refer in any way to the well owner's property right in the
oil and gas in place.
The Marginal Well Act has a definite place in the conservation
laws of Texas. But its current statutory form does not give the Com-
mission sufficient discretion. A simple amendment would provide the
Commision with such discretion. Such an amendment need only
prescribe that, in addition to the depth-capacity definition of mar-
ginal wells, the well must also be one which ". . . would be damaged,
or result in a loss of production ultimately recoverable, or cause the
premature abandonment of same, if its maximum daily production
were artificially curtailed." In addition, a requirement that notice
and an opportunity for a hearing be given to all interested parties
prior to classifying a well as marginal would provide for self-protec-
tion of correlative rights.
CONCLUSION
The principal conclusion to be drawn from a review of Texas
proration is that it has been an outstandingly successful conservation
measure. Considering the multitude of interlocking and detailed fac-
tors involved in proration, the fact that there have been so few dis-
criminatory orders is a tribute to both the Commission and the
legislation creating the Commission's authority.
The major defect in current proration practices is the failure to
protect correlative rights. This failure is often camouflaged by refer-
ence to the rule of capture - a rule found sound only to free one
operator from liability for his neighbor's lack of diligence in view
of regulatory restrictions upon the use of the correlative right of
defense. As Texas property law includes the principles of ownership
of oil and gas in place, it is concluded that this failure to protect
correlative rights results in confiscation in several situations.
The most prevalent confiscatory situation occurs in those reservoirs
having a large associated gas cap owned by persons having sub-
stantially smaller interests in the contiguous oil zone. In the majority
of these reservoirs, Rule 6 (b) governing the proration of associated
gas results in undue discrimination tantamount to confiscation of
the gas owners interest. A revision of Rule 6(b) would eliminate
such confiscation but would result in waste.
Unitization of all interests on a fair and reasonable basis would
not only eliminate confiscation but would also prevent waste, in that
waste is the loss of otherwise recoverable oil and unitization uni-
versally increases the amount of recoverable hydrocarbons. A statute
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authorizing the Commission to require unitization to prevent waste
and to protect correlative rights under a profitable plan of produc-
tion would act to protect rather than restrict property rights.
A second confiscatory situation prevails in the older fields where
proration is essentially on a per-well basis and numerous exceptions
have been made to the spacing rule. Better waste prevention resulting
from fewer wells and protection of correlative rights could be realized
from a statute giving the Commission authority to compel the pool-
ing of these interests in order to preserve the spacing pattern. Such
statutes are being successfully administered in all but two of the
oil producing states; in none has it resulted in the wholesale litigation
and numerous inequities brought about by the complex spacing and
exceptions rule of Texas.
The Marginal Well Act has permitted confiscatory conditions
where production has been restricted to a market demand less than
the efficient productive capacity of the reservoir. In such instances
the act has actually resulted in inefficient wells having higher allow-
ables than the efficient wells. This situation could be eliminated by
minor amendments to the act. One such amendment would restrict
a marginal well to the maximum production for which the well
would qualify if it were not marginal. The second amendment would
add the requirement that classification of a well as marginal include
a showing that loss of oil would occur by the restriction of the well
below its "maximum capacity."
Granville Dutton
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